





Share Tenancy, Ownership Structure, and Prevented Planting Claims  




Roderick M. Rejesus 
Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics 
Texas Tech University,  
Box 42132, Lubbock, TX 79409-2132 
Phone Number: (806)742-2821 ext. 253 
FAX Number: (806)742-1099 
E-Mail: roderick.rejesus@ttu.edu 
 
Cesar L. Escalante  
Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics,  
University of Georgia,  
Room 312A, Conner Hall, Athens, Georgia 30602 
Phone Number: (706)542-0740 
FAX Number: (706)542-4131 
E-Mail: cescalante@agecon.uga.edu 
 
Ashley C. Lovell 
Center for Agribusiness Excellence 
Tarleton State University,  
Box T-0055, Stephenville, Texas 76402,  
Phone Number: (254)918-7676 








Paper prepared for presentation at the American Agricultural Economics Association Annual 






Copyright 2003 by R.M. Rejesus, C.L. Escalante, and A.C. Lovell.  All rights reserved.  Readers may 
make verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided that this 




A theoretical model based on opportunity cost and expected utility principles establishes 
linkages between the likelihood of prevented planting claims in crop insurance, existing share 
leasing arrangements and internal farm business structures.  Results of probit estimation 
procedures indicate that simpler internal business structures and a more dominant farmer-tenant 
leasing position can increase the probability of submitting a prevented planting claim. 
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The prevented planting provision is a standard element of crop insurance contracts. This 
provision allows an insured producer to receive an indemnity payment if he fails to plant an 
insured crop before a designated planting date, due to a valid cause of loss. The Risk 
Management Agency (RMA) Compliance Office views prevented planting as a potential source 
of program vulnerability because producers can receive prevented planting payment without 
incurring the major costs associated with production of the crop. Payment received due to 
prevented planting is a positive cash flow to the producer without expending the effort and 
financial resources to plant, tend, and harvest the crop. Hence, an insured dishonest producer 
may have incentives to take advantage of this provision and submit a fraudulent prevented 
planting claim, rather than planting and producing a crop for harvest. 
The objective of this study is to determine whether the type of ownership structure 
significantly affects the likelihood of submitting a prevented planting claim. Two dimensions of 
ownership structure will be analyzed in this study:  the landlord-farmer management relationship 
under a share leasing arrangement and internal arrangements of farm management under single 
proprietorship, partnership and corporate business structures.  Understanding the relationship 
between ownership structure and prevented planting can help the RMA formulate strategies to 
mitigate the abuse of this provision. Ratemaking for additional prevented planting coverage may 
also be improved with the knowledge about the relationship of ownership structure and 
prevented planting. Moreover, the RMA can also use the information from this study to profile 
farmers that are more likely to submit prevented planting claims and investigate them pro-
actively to deter potentially fraudulent claims (GAO).   2
  The paper is organized as follows. A theoretical model elucidating the hypothesized 
effects of opportunity costs, the farmer-tenant’s stipulated share in a leasing contract, and 
ownership structure on the probability of filing a prevented planting claim is developed in the 
next section. The empirical methods, results, and conclusions are discussed in the remaining 
three sections. 
Theoretical Framework 
This study’s basic theoretical framework initially focuses on the influence of different 
levels of management and risk sharing between the farm owner(s) and landlord(s).  These 
contracts are usually negotiated or renewed by tenants and landlords periodically and, hence, are 
less permanent arrangements.  The conceptual model will subsequently be extended to analyze 
the effects of various types of internal ownership structures (single versus multiple business 
owners) on decisions to file prevented planting claims.   
Farmland Control Options 
Farmland leasing has become an increasingly popular strategy for expanding control of 
farmland acreage.   In 1998, leased farmland comprised 43.8% of farmland acres in the country.  
This figure is much higher than the average proportion of leased acreage for most of the census 
years since the turn of the century (Hoppe and Wiebe).   Farmland leasing options include the 
payment of cash rents, sharing of crop income and costs between the farmer and the landlord or 
hybrid contracts involving combinations of these two options.  This study focuses merely on 
share lease contracts inasmuch as the farmer is able to maintain autonomy in making business 
decisions under a cash-lease contract. 
Relative to farmland ownership, a share lease contract provides farmers with significant 
incentives that include higher farm returns, business risk reduction and improved liquidity   3
conditions.  Empirical evidence suggests that farm operators generally realize higher accounting 
rates of return under a leasing strategy (Scott; Ellinger and Barry).  Owned farmland traditionally 
generates low current farm returns due its non-depreciability and the accrual of capital gains that 
are only realized upon liquidation of the asset (Oltmans; Barry and Robison).   
Moreover, a share lease contract is a much more risk efficient farmland control option 
compared to land ownership (Janssen; Barry, et al.).  The positive correlation between value of 
harvested crops and the tenant’s rental payments to the landowner stabilizes the farmer’s net 
income, thus providing greater risk-reducing benefits to the farmer. 
Share leases also provide farmers with liquidity-enhancing opportunities.  Under these 
contracts, the landlord is obligated to disburse his/her contribution of the variable costs whenever 
such costs are incurred and paid.  Surveys and studies in the Midwest (Bullen; Reiss and Koenig) 
indicate consistent sharing of costs of fertilizer, pesticides, seed and other crop expenses between 
tenants and landlords.  Other contracts allegedly extend cost sharing to expenses for drying, 
storing and insuring crops.  The sharing of these costs offers significant liquidity relief for the 
farmers who only provide funds to pay for only their share as stipulated in the leasing contract.  
These incentives, however, are weighed against a “premium” that a farm operator assigns 
to the benefit of autonomy enjoyed under full land ownership.  The autonomy premium becomes 
an important consideration in the issue being analyzed in this study where farmers consider the 
filing of prevented planting claims. 
Share Tenancy and Prevented Planting Claims 
  Consider a risk-averse tenant (or producer) and a risk-averse landlord with a share 
tenancy lease arrangement. Further, assume that both the producer and the landlord bought an 
Actual Production History (APH) crop insurance contract covering their respective shares of   4
crop output.
1 The APH contract is an individual yield insurance plan that protects producers and 
landlords against yield shortfalls if their share of actual yield falls below the guaranteed level. 
APH insurance includes catastrophic coverage (CAT) and optional buy-up levels of coverage 
above CAT. For a flat fee of $60 per crop per farm, CAT provides a 50 percent yield guarantee 
and pays an indemnity based on 55 percent of the price election. In this paper, we separate CAT 
and APH buy-up coverage and hereafter refer to APH buy-up as APH insurance.  
APH insurance provides yield protection of up to 85 percent of the producer’s or the 
landlord’s share of average historical yield, with a premium based on a chosen yield coverage 
level. Let λ  be the tenant’s share of the yield and let (1 - λ ) be the landlord’s share of the yield. 
An APH contract pays an indemnity if the producer’s actual yield (
a a
F Y Y λ = ) or the landlord’s 
actual yield (
a a
L Y Y ) 1 ( λ − = ) falls below the guaranteed yield level (Y
g), but offers no price 
protection.
2 The guaranteed yield for the tenant and the landlord is computed based on the 
following formula: 




F Y Y λ θ =  




L Y Y ) 1 ( λ θ − =  
where θ  is the percent yield coverage chosen by the producer or landlord (θ = 0.50, 0.55, 0.60, 
0.65, 0.70, 0.75, 0.80, 0.85) and 
e Y is the expected yield based on the average historical yield.
3 
 If 
a Y  at harvest is greater than 
g Y for both the producer and landlord, then the insured 
producer and the landlord do not receive indemnity payments and their payoffs are 
                                                 
1 Even if only APH crop insurance contract is modeled here, the authors believe that the qualitative results will not 
be significantly altered under revenue insurance. The empirical portion however will include an insurance type 
variable that may indicate whether alternative insurance plans have an effect on the likelihood of submitting a 
prevented planting claim. 
2 Hereinafter, notations with F subscripts pertain to the tenant/producer and notations with L subscripts pertain to the 
landlord. 
3 If the producer/landlord has no adequate actual yield history (i.e. 4-year yield history), assigned transitional yields 
(T-yields) are used to establish the initial 4-year yield history.   5
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m P is the market price at harvest, η is 
the cost share of the producer, and 
p C is the total cost of production through harvest. On the 








L Y Y <  at harvest, then both the insured producer and landlord 
receive an indemnity payment and their payoffs are 
p m a g
F
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p m a g
L
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L L C P Y P Y Y ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ] ) 1 ( ) 1 ( [ η λ λ λ θ − − − + − − − , respectively, where 
g P  is the guaranteed 
or elected price. The guaranteed price is a certain fixed proportion of the expected price, which is 
usually the USDA’s projected farm level price for the crop year. This chosen fixed proportion of 
the expected price ranges from 0.59 to 1.00. 
For notational simplicity, let the following expressions hold: 
(3)      
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(6)     
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L C P Y ) 1 ( ) 1 ( η λ − − − = Φ . 
Assuming that the insured producer and the insured landlord have a von Neumann-Morgenstern 
utility functions with  0 " , 0 ' < > U U , the producer’s and the landlord’s expected utilities can then 
be expressed as follows: 
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where h is the probability of 
g a Y Y <  and W is the non-contingent wealth defined as initial 
wealth less the insurance premium (p) paid ( p W W − = 0 ).    6
  Prevented planting provisions are included in standard APH crop insurance contracts. As 
stated above, the prevented planting provision in the U.S. crop insurance program allows for 
insured producers to receive an indemnity payment if a producer fails to plant an insured crop 
before a designated planting date for that crop and county, due to a valid cause of loss. The cause 
of loss must be general in the surrounding area and must have prevented other producers in the 
area from planting their crops. Prevented planting payments for the producer and the landlord are 
based on a guaranteed prevented planting yield computed as follows: 






F Y Y Y γ λ θ γ = =  
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where  F γ  and  L γ  are the percent prevented planting guarantee reduction percentage chosen by 
the producer and landlord ( L F γ γ = = 0.60, 0.65, 0.70).
4 Prevented planting guarantee reduction 
levels at 0.65 and 0.70 are additional buy-up coverage. If an insured producer is prevented from 
planting and receives a prevented planting payment, his utility can be expressed as 
) (
A






F C P Y η λ θ γ − = Φ  and 
pp C  is the production cost incurred by the 
producer at the point that he was prevented from planting (i.e. fertilizer, herbicide, land rental, 
tillage cost, other pre-planting costs). Consequently, the landlord’s utility will be  ) (
A







L C P Y ) 1 ( ) 1 ( η λ θ γ − − − = Φ .  
  If the submission of prevented planting claims by the tenant and the landlord are totally 
independent, then the tenant and the landlord will submit prevented planting claims if and only if 
the following conditions hold for each of them respectively: 
                                                 
4 The prevented planting guarantee reductions presented here apply to most crops (i.e. corn, wheat, grain sorghum, 
soybeans), but some crops have different selection guarantee reduction choices. For example, rice has prevented 
planting guarantee reductions of 0.45, 0.50, and 0.55, while cotton has prevented planting guarantee reductions of 
0.50, 0.55, and 0.60.   7
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However, submitting prevented planting claims by the tenant and the landlord are not usually 
independent. The tenant has the primary responsibility to decide whether to submit a prevented 
planting claim or not. If the tenant submits a prevented planting claim, the landlord has no choice 
but to also submit a prevented planting claim. The tenant is the key decision-maker in this case 
because he decides whether to submit a claim or not.  
  The landlord, on the other hand, can agree or disagree with the decision of the tenant, 
even though he has no choice but to follow the tenant’s decision when the tenant decides to 
submit a prevented planting claim. If the landlord agrees with the tenant, then conditions (11) 
and (12) hold and both are content. If the landlord disagrees with the tenant submitting a 
prevented planting claim, the landlord may terminate the relationship with the tenant and the 
tenant may loose the future income streams from leasing the landlord’s land. The tenant’s 
opportunity cost of disagreeing with the landlord can be defined as: 








AL p m a
F
LL p m a
F
r
C P Y C P Y
1 ) 1 (
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where 
LL p m a
F C P Y )] [ η λ −  is the potential net revenue from the present landlord’s land in year n, 
AL p m a
F C P Y )] [ η λ −  is the potential net revenue from an alternative landlord’s land in year n, N is 
the time horizon, and r is the discount rate.  
  The tenant’s expected utility can now be defined as: 
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where g is the probability that the landlord agrees with the decision to submit a prevented 
planting claim. Therefore, the tenant will submit a prevented planting claim if and only if:   8
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Assume that there exists a landlord agreement probability g ~ that makes the tenant 
indifferent between submitting a prevented planting claim and endeavoring to grow the crop: 
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See Appendix for the proof. 
 Let  α be the probability that the tenant will submit a prevented planting claim. The 
tenant’s problem is to choose α to maximize expected utility 
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> 0, then α is a decreasing function of Λ. Since the relationship between the 
tenant share amount (λ) and g ~  is ambiguous, we must empirically test whether α is an increasing 
or a decreasing function of λ.    9
The theoretical results above can be summed-up in the following propositions: 
Proposition 1. A tenant who has a lower opportunity cost of terminating a relationship with the 
landlord is more likely to submit a prevented planting claim.  
Proposition 2. The effect of the tenant’s share amount on the likelihood of submitting a prevented 
planting claim is theoretically ambiguous and must be verified empirically.  
From the tenant’s view, if the opportunity costs (i.e. income streams foregone) are less 
than the potential prevented planting payment, then the tenant is more inclined to file a claim 
even if the landlord disagrees. Thus, the tenant has more incentives to go ahead and submit a 
prevented planting claim even regardless whether the landlord disagrees or not. As mentioned 
above, the effect of tenant share needs to be empirically tested because the theoretical model 
indicates that tenant shares may either have a negative or a positive relationship with the 
likelihood of submitting a prevented planting claim. 
Internal Ownership Structures and Prevented Planting Claims 
  This analysis is also extended to the internal ownership structures of farm businesses.  In 
several surveys conducted by the USDA during the last few decades, results have consistently 
shown that 9 out of 10 farms in the country have been organized as single proprietorships.  
Partnerships have usually accounted for about 5 to 6 percent of the farms.  However, recent 
trends of increasing industrialization accompanied by growth in firm size and increasing 
complexity of business transactions in the farm sector have shifted considerable attention to the 
potential growth in the number of non-family corporations among farm businesses.   
The choice of the form of business organization can be attributed to preferences for 
simple business structures, greater control over operations and financial decisions, business 
continuity, tax implications and access to capital, among others (Dahl; Boehlje and Lins).    10
Thomas and Boehlje also emphasize the importance of stage of the life cycle for the business and 
its owner(s) in the choice of business structure.   
Partnerships and corporations are typically more complex organizational structures that 
bring together different stakeholders collectively making operational and management decisions 
for the farm business.  These structures are usually associated with larger farms where business 
decisions extend beyond the usual production and marketing routines of smaller farm businesses 
and the complexity of operations requires the technical expertise of other decision-makers.   
The single proprietor of a farm business, however, enjoys autonomy and does not need to 
confer with others in making decisions for the farm business.   
Given the varied levels of complexity of the decision-making process under the different 
business structures, the following propositions relating to decisions on prevented planting claims 
are formulated:  
Proposition 3. Producers who are single proprietors are more likely to submit a prevented 
planting claim relative to producers operating under a partnership or corporate structure. 
Proposition 4.  Producers doing business through a partnership are more likely to submit a 
prevented planting claim relative to producers associated with farm corporations. 
  These propositions are more justified within the context of our earlier contention 
regarding the influence of share tenancy contracts on decisions to file prevented planting claims.  
The more structured decision-making process in partnership and corporate organizations adds 
another dimension of complexity in reaching a decision to file a prevented planting claim.  The 
degree to which this is a noticeable constraint would depend upon the number of partners or 
stockholders. It can, however, be argued that a consensus can be relatively easier to reach among 
internal owners (i.e. partners and stockholders) rather than between landlords and tenants,   11
although the bureaucratic procedures typically present among more complex organizational 
structures could slow down the decision-making process and may have limited favor for 
prevented planting claims.   
Hybrid Arrangements of Internal Ownership and Share Leasing Contracts 
  Figure 1 presents possible combinations of internal business ownership and share leasing 
arrangements.  A hierarchical ordering of business scenarios is defined by consolidating the 
arguments presented in the previous hypotheses on the farmer’s tendency to make prevented 
planting claims under different ownership and share leasing structures.  
The hierarchy is basically designed according to the complexity of the decision-making 
process within the farm business determined simply by the number of people, including both 
internal owners and landlords
5 that could influence farm business decisions. Consistent with 
Propositions 3 and 4, simpler decision-making structures are assigned higher placements in the 
“pyramid” and thus, are expected to demonstrate greater likelihood of filing prevented planting 
claims than business arrangements assigned lower placements.   
In levels 2 and 3 where hybrid arrangements of internal ownership and share leasing 
arrangements are presented, a left-side placement is assigned a higher probability of filing such 
claims than business cases found to its right.  These expectations are summarized in the 
following proposition: 
Proposition 5: Producers who operate under simpler internal business structures and 
simultaneously enter into share leasing agreements are more likely to submit a prevented 
planting claim relative to producers operating under more structured internal organizations and 
                                                 
5 Landlord influence is typically a function of their level of participation, the size of their share, the size of their 
cropland holdings, and the proportion of the landlord’s cropland farmed by the tenant.   12
a comparable share leasing contract where the landlord could exert at least the same degree of 
influence in the farm business decision-making process. 
  Specifically, single proprietorships that do not enter into any share-leasing contract 
occupy the uppermost level of the pyramid.  When two decision-makers are involved, a business 
partnership is more likely to file a claim than a single proprietorship under a share-leasing 
contract, unless the landlord’s share is significantly small enough to diminish his role in farm 
decision-making. 
  Under Level 3, there is a greater chance for a closely-held corporate organization without 
crop share leasing obligations to file such a claim than the other two business cases.  With 
landlord participation in the decision-making process, a multiple-owner farm corporation 
undergoes the most complicated negotiation process in this hierarchy since it will require 
consensus of all internal and external business stakeholders to reach a decision to file a prevented 
planting claim. 
Empirical Methods and Data 
A binary choice model is used to empirically test the theoretical predictions above. An 
insured producer has to make a choice between submitting a prevented planting claim or not.  
From the theory, an insured producer will submit a prevented planting claim if the expected 
utility of claiming prevented planting is greater than the expected utility of attempting to grow 
the crop to harvest. Since the expected utility of submitting a prevented planting claim is 
unobservable, we model the difference between the expected utility of prevented planting and 
bringing the crop to harvest as: 
( 2 4 )         ε + = i x β' * i y    13
where * i y  is the unobservable variable. The  i x  vector represents the variables that affect 
likelihood of submitting a prevented planting claim and the β'  vector is the corresponding 
parameters. We assume that ε  has a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance 1.  
  We do not observe expected utility but we do observe whether a prevented planting claim 
has been submitted or not. Thus, a binary variable can be defined as: 
(25)     y = 1     if   * i y  > 0 
(26)     y = 0    otherwise. 
In our case, y = 1 if a prevented planting claim has been submitted and y = 0 otherwise. It 
follows that: 
(27)    Prob  (y = 1)  =  Prob ( i x β' − > ε ) 
                 =   F( i x β' ) 
where F is the cumulative distribution function of ε (Greene).  Since we assumed a normal 
distribution for ε , the probit form of the model is estimated here. The probit distribution is given 
by 
(28)       Prob(y = 1) = ∫ ∞ −
i x β'
dt t) ( ϕ  
where ϕ  represent the standard normal distribution. A maximum likelihood procedure is used to 
estimate the parameters of the binary choice models above. Because the estimated coefficients 
arising from these regressions are not marginal effects, additional calculations are necessary. 
Following Greene, the marginal effects for the probit model is given by: 











Note that the marginal effects in this study are computed at the means of  i x .      14
In this study, only RMA data of insured producers for reinsurance year (RY) 2001 are 
considered and Catastrophic (CAT) insurance policies are excluded from the analysis. Only crop 
insurance data under the RMA’s southern regional compliance office (RCO) for corn, cotton, 
oats, onions, peanuts, rice, soybeans, and wheat are considered. Producers who bought a valid 
insurance policy are included in the data, regardless of whether they submitted a prevented 
planting claim or not. The data are aggregated at the crop policy level for a particular crop, type 
and practice. This results in 190,079 valid observations. 
  The dependent variable in this study is a binary variable (PPC) where PPC = 1 if a 
prevented planting claim was submitted and PPC = 0 otherwise. The elements of vector  i x  
representing the independent variables of the model are listed in Table 1.  Four estimating 
equations are considered in this study: a general model that considers all farm observations and 
three other versions of the original model applied to subsets of farms classified according to the 
type of business organization (i.e. single proprietorship, partnership and corporate farms). 
To empirically verify proposition 1, a variable representing expected crop revenues 
(REVENUE) is used as proxy for opportunity cost.   This variable is derived using annualized 
crop prices from the USDA's Agricultural Outlook publication and expected yield information 
from the RMA database that is based on a 4-10 year yield history that captures the potential 
productivity of the landlord’s land. Based on the arguments supporting proposition 1, we would 
expect the sign of REVENUE to be negative. Proposition 2 is empirically tested by examining 
the sign related to the SHARE variable (i.e. the farmer-tenant's share in the leasing contract), in 
all four models.  From the theory, there is no a priori expectation for the sign of this variable. 
Propositions 3 and 4 are verified by examining the sign and the magnitude of the dummy 
variables for the type of business organization (SINGLE and PARTNER) in the all farms model.     15
The signs of SINGLE and PARTNER are expected to be positive. Proposition 5 is verified by 
comparing the signs and magnitudes of the SHARE variable in the three versions of the model 
developed for the types of business organizations. 
There are no a priori expectations for the rest of the dummy variables included in the 
model (i.e. geographical dummy variables, etc.). Summary Statistics and frequencies of the 
dummy variables are in Table 2. A planted acres variable (ACRES) was also included in the 
model to allow for scale effects.   
Results and Discussion 
  Estimation results of the probit model, together with the estimated marginal effects, are 
presented in Table 3.  The likelihood ratio (LR) test indicates that the coefficient vector is not 
zero because the LR chi-square statistic with 21 degrees of freedom is significant at the 1% level. 
However, the reported goodness-of-fit measures (i.e. pseudo R
2 and the McKelvey and Zavoina 
R
2) indicate that the regression line only fits moderately well. 
  As expected, the variable that proxies for the opportunity cost of terminating the 
landlord-tenant relationship (REVENUE) has a statistically significant negative effect on the 
probability of submitting a prevented planting claim in the all farms model as well as in the three 
(3) farm business models. However, in all four instances, the magnitude of the marginal effect of 
REVENUE on the likelihood of submitting a prevented planting claim is small.  A unit increase 
in REVENUE decreases the probability of submitting a prevented planting claim by 0.000001. 
The negative sign of the REVENUE coefficient verifies our theory that lower opportunity costs 
increases the likelihood of submitting a prevented planting claim (and vice-versa).  Though the 
magnitude of this effect may be very small, the results establish it as one of the significant 
determinants of the farmer's tendency to file a prevented planting claim.    16
  The estimated coefficient related to the farmer tenant's share in the leasing contract 
(SHARE) has a statistically significant positive sign in all four models. This suggests that the 
likelihood of submitting a prevented planting claim increases as the tenant share increases.  
Under the three different business type models, the marginal effect of the SHARE variable is 
larger for single proprietorship farms (0.03210) than corporate (0.01760) and partnership 
(0.01544) farms.  This verifies our contention that less structured business organizations with 
smaller number of business decision-makers would experience less constraints in making 
decisions to submit prevented planting claims.  Thus, as the hierarchy in Figure 1 suggests, 
simpler forms of business organization such as single proprietorship farms with substantial share 
in leasing contracts have greater flexibility in making prevented planting claims than farm 
business cases with more complicated business structures presented in the lower levels of the 
hierarchy. 
  The business type dummy variables (SINGLE and PARTNER) in the all farms model 
both have significant positive effects on the dependent variable.  This therefore suggests that 
farms belonging to both business types have greater tendencies to submit prevented planting 
claims than corporate farms.  Between the two results, SINGLE has a larger marginal effect 
(0.00606) than PARTNER (0.00403), thus, confirming the expectation that, between these two 
types of farms, sole proprietorship farms enjoy a much greater edge over corporate farms in 
terms of less structural constraints in making business decisions.    
  The size variable, ACRES, also has a significant negative effect on the dependent 
variable in all four models.  This supports the notion that larger-scale operations involve higher 
fixed costs, which then reduces the attractiveness of submitting a prevented planting claim as 
compared to carrying the crop to harvest. Notably, ACRES has a larger marginal effect among   17
single proprietorship farms than the other two business types.  Perhaps, this suggests that, among 
such farms, larger farm size not only could translate to higher opportunity costs but also could 
have resulted from greater reliance on leasing arrangements to expand control of farmland 
acreage (thus accommodating higher landlord shares in leasing arrangements).  Both of these 
factors have been earlier associated with lower probabilities of filing prevented planting claims. 
  The coefficients related to insurance plans (CRC and APH), states, and crops also 
deserve some discussion here. Results from the four models indicate that producers who 
purchased APH contracts are less likely to submit a prevented planting claim relative to other 
producers who bought other insurance plans. The insurance plan dummy variable for the CRC 
option was only significant in the partnership farm model. These results suggest that there may 
be some merit in exploring differential prevented planting buy-up rates for APH and non-APH 
plans since producers with APH plans are less likely to submit a prevented planting claim.    
The coefficients and marginal effects of the crop dummy variables indicate that there are 
several significant crop-specific effects. In the all farms model, producers of cotton, oats, onions, 
and peanuts are less likely to submit a prevented planting claim relative to producers of corn, 
while producers of rice, soybeans, and wheat are more likely to submit a prevented planting 
claim relative to producers of corn. In the three business type models, the coefficient signs of 
these crop dummy variables consistently indicate the same trend; however, certain crop dummies 
lose their significance in one or two models.   
The coefficients and marginal effects of the state dummy variables also suggest that there 
are significant geographical effects. In the all farms model, producers in Louisiana, New Mexico, 
Oklahoma and Texas tend to have a higher probability of submitting an anomalous prevented 
planting claim, relative to the excluded state (Arkansas). Producers in Kentucky, Mississippi and   18
Tennessee tend to have a lower probability of submitting a potentially fraudulent prevented 
planting claim, relative to the excluded state (Arkansas).  Among these, the dummy variables for 
Louisiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma and Texas consistently had similar and significant effects in 
all the three business type models.  The other state variables were also able to retain similar 
coefficient signs but had insignificant explanatory power in one of the three other models. 
Conclusions 
  The results of this study suggest that a farmer’s decision to submit a prevented planting 
claim in crop insurance is not only governed by opportunity cost principles, but can also be 
influenced by the magnitude of the farmer’s stipulated share in a leasing contract and the type of 
internal organizational set-up of the farm business.  Specifically, more dominant shares for the 
farmer-tenant under a leasing arrangement increase the likelihood of submitting a prevented 
planting claim.  Moreover, sole proprietorship farms exhibit a greater tendency to make the same 
decisions than farms operating under either partnership or corporate structures.  Sole proprietor 
situations are characterized by less complex organizational structures that provide farmers with 
greater autonomy and flexibility in making decisions without having to reach a consensus with a 
larger group of stakeholders that could have differing opinions and influence.   
When hybrid arrangements of share tenancy and internal business organizations are 
considered, this study provides evidence that the smaller the collective number of both internal 
(farm owners) and external (landlords) decision-makers, the greater the likelihood for the farm to 
submit prevented planting claims. 
  Share-tenancy arrangements appear to be an institutional “self-policing” mechanism that 
reduces the probability of submitting prevented planting claims. This, in turn, can reduce the 
probability to abuse the prevented planting provision. Given this result, RMA can reformulate   19
their ratemaking procedures for additional prevented planting buy-up coverage by considering 
the self-policing effect of share-tenancy arrangements. Perhaps the RMA can consider giving 
prevented planting buy-up discounts for share tenants with lower shares. In addition, the 
empirical results with regards to the claim behavior of producers with non-APH plans (versus 
producers with APH plans) suggest that a differential prevented planting buy-up rate for different 
insurance plans may deserve further exploration and analysis. 
  Ownership structure and share-leasing arrangements can also be used by the RMA 
compliance office as an additional variable to profile producers that are most likely to abuse 
prevented planting provisions. In conjunction with other “fraud” indicator variables, RMA may 
be able to better prioritize individuals worthy of further investigation or worthy of in-season 












   20
References 
Barry, P. J. and L. J. Robison. “Economic Versus Accounting Rates of Return for Farm Land.” 
Land Economics, 62 (November 1986):388-401. 
 
Barry, P. J., L. M. Moss, N. L. Sotomayor and C. L. Escalante. “Lease Pricing for Farm Real 
Estate.” Review of Agricultural Economics, 22 (Spring/Summer 2000): 2-16. 
 
Boehlje, M. D. and D. Lins. “Alternative Financial/Organizational Structures of Farm and 
Agribusiness Firms.” Cooperative Extension Service, Purdue University, NCR-568, April 
1995. 
 
Bullen, G. Farmers’ Leasing Practices in Illinois. Cooperative Extension Service, University of 
 Illinois,  1999. 
 
Dahl, D. C. “A New Look at Farm Business Organization.” Minnesota Agricultural Economist, 
  Agricultural Extension Service, Univ. of Minnesota, No. 681 (Summer 1995); pp.1-4. 
 
Ellinger, P. N. and P. J. Barry. "The Effects of Tenure Position on Farm Profitability and 
  Solvency:  An Application to Illinois Farms." Agricultural Finance Review, 
 47(1987):  106-18. 
 
Greene, W. Econometric Analysis. Fourth Edition, Prentice Hall: Upper Saddle River, NJ, 2000. 
 
Hoppe, R. and K. Wiebe. “Land Ownership and Farm Structure.” In Agricultural Resources and  
  Environmental Indicators, 2000. Resources Division, Economic Research Service, U. S. 
  Department of Agriculture, September 2000. 
 
Janssen, L. “Empirical Analysis of Tenure Patterns and Farm Structure,” in Size, Structure, and 
  the Changing Face of American Agriculture, A. Hallam, ed., Boulder, CO: Westview 
 Press,  1993. 
 
Johnson, J. and Perry, J. E. “Business Organization and Arrangements of Farms.” in Structures 
  and Financial Characteristics of U. S. Farms:  2001 U. S. Family Farm Report. R. A. 
 Hoppe,  ed. Resource Economics Division, Economic Research Service, U. S. Department 
  of Agriculture, Agriculture Information Bulletin No. 768, May 2001. 
 
Oltmans, Arnold W., "Why Farmland Cannot, Will Not and Should Not Pay for Itself," The 
  Journal of American Society of Farm Managers and Rural Appraisers. (1995): 57-67. 
 
Reiss, F. J. and C. J. Koenig. “Farm Leasing Practices in South-Eastern Counties.” Department 
  of Agricultural Economics, University of Illinois, July 1980. 
 
Scott, J. T., Jr. "Changes in Capital and Income Relationships." N. C. Journal of Agricultural 
 Economics. 5(July 1983):27-37. 
   21
Thomas, K. H. and M. D. Boehlje. “Farm Business Arrangements: Which One for You?” North 
  Central Region Education Materials Project, Iowa State University, NCR Extension 
  Publication No. 50, 1991. 
 
U.S. Department of Agriculture Office of the Inspector General (USDA OIG). Risk Management 
  Agency Prevented Plantings of 1996 Insured Crops. Audit Report No. 05601-5-Te, 
  USDA OIG: Washington, D.C. March 1999.  
 
U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO). Crop Insurance: USDA Needs a Better Estimate of 
  Improper Payments to Strengthen Controls Over Claims. GAO/RCED 99-266, U.S. 
  GAO: Washington, D.C. September 1999. 
 
 
   22
Table 1. Independent variables used in the empirical model and its description. 
Variable Name  Variable Definition 
  
REVENUE  Expected crop revenues based on annualized crop prices and yield based on a 
4-10 year yield history (or T-yields if history is not adequate) 
  
SHARE  Farmer tenant’s percentage share under a share leasing contract 
  
SINGLE  Dummy variable indicating single proprietorship type of business.  SINGLE = 
1 if full ownership, SINGLE = 0 otherwise. 
  
PARTNER  Dummy variable indicating partnership type of business. PARTNER = 1 if 
partnership, PARTNER = 0 otherwise. 
  
CORP  Dummy variable indicating corporate type of business. CORP = 1 if 
partnership, CORP = 0 otherwise.  CORP is the excluded business 
classification variable in the estimating equation. 
  
ACRES Producers’  planted  acres 
  
CRC  Dummy variable representing the Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC) insurance 
plan. CRC = 1 if the insurance plan is CRC, CRC = 0 otherwise. 
  
APH  Dummy variable representing the standard APH (or MPCI) yield insurance 
plan. APH = 1 if the insurance plan is APH, APH = 0 otherwise. 
  
KY, LA, MS, 
NM, OK, TN, 
TX, AK 
Geographical state dummy variables. The states in the southern RCO are  
Kentucky (KY), Louisiana (LA), Mississippi (MS), New Mexico (NM), 
Oklahoma (OK), Tennessee (TN), Texas (TX), and Arkansas (AK). Arkansas 






Dummy variable representing the crop planted. The crops are: cotton (COT), 
oats (OAT), onions (ONI), peanuts (PNT), rice (RCE), soybeans (SOY), wheat 
(WHT) and corn (CRN). Corn is the excluded category.  
  
   23




Mean   Standard 
Deviation
Min.  Max.  No. of Obs.
SHARE (%)  59.35  34.18 0.10  100.00  190,079
REVENUE ($)  5,623.97  8,975.44 2.80  51,319.75  190,079
ACRES 178.09  307.90 0.02  17,041  190,079
      
(b) Dummy 
Variables 
Frequency Percent (b)  Dummy 
Variables 
Frequency Percent
PPC  7,914 4.16 TN  8,130 4.28
SINGLE  149,270 78.53 TX  98,393 51.76
PARTNER  21,256 11.18 AK  25,184 13.25
CORP  19,553 10.29 COT  52,506 27.62
CRC 46,007  24.20 OAT  785 0.41
APH 136,354 71.74 ONI  283  0.15
KY  9,159 4.82 PNT  4,133 2.17
LA  11,142 5.86 RCE  8,935 4.70
MS 9,523  5.01 SOY  27,919  14.69
NM 2,002  1.05 WHT  45,936  24.17
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Table 3. Estimation results of the probit model for all farms and subsets of single proprietorship, partnership and corporate farms 
 



























































































































































































































































































































































*  -0.18415 -0.00340
  0.25105 0.01012   25








































































































Observations 190,079  149,270  20,988
  19,205
 
Log Likelihood  -27,651.60  -23,289.59  -2,227.92  -2,043.06 








0.385 0.372 0.428 0.314 
Pseudo R
2  0.1596 0.1584 0.1703 0.1399 
Notes:  (1) Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (*), 5% (**) and 10% (***) confidence levels;  
 (2) The variable PNT was dropped from the partnership and corporate farm equations due to its poor predictive power.  As a 
result, some observations were automatically discarded by the statistical program. 
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Appendix 
  In this Appendix, we show that 
Λ ∂
∂g ~
> 0 and 
λ ∂
∂g ~
 < or > 0. To reduce notational clutter, 
assume that: 
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This implies that: 
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Note that (0 <  g ~  < 1), 
N Ψ > 0, and 
D Ψ  > 0.  
  The first derivative of g ~  with respect to Λ is 
(A4)     0
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Since 0 < g ~  < 1, then we know that 
D Ψ  > 
N Ψ . Moreover,  ) ( ) (
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F F W W . Given these conditions, the numerator of (A4) is 
positive and therefore (A4) is positive. 
   The first derivative of g ~  with respect to λ is 
(A5)     2









> or < 0, 
where: 
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F F F P Y W U θ γ Λ − Φ + = Ω , and   28
(A9)   ] )][ ( [ ] )][ ( [











F F F P Y W U P Y W U θ γ θ γ Λ − Φ + − Φ + = Ω . 
If   0 ] [
3 2 1 > Ω − Ω + Ω and 
4 3 2 1 ] [ Ω > Ω − Ω + Ω , then (A5) is greater than zero. On the other 
hand, if  0 ] [
3 2 1 < Ω − Ω + Ω , then (A5) is less than zero. 
 